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PROPERTIED RITES
BEYOND BELIEF, BEYOND CONSCIENCE: THE
RADICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FREE EXERCISE
OF RELIGION. By Jack N. Rakove.1 Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2020. Pp. 240. $22.95 (Hardcover).
CHURCH STATE CORPORATION: CONSTRUING
RELIGION IN US LAW. By Winnifred Fallers Sullivan.2
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020. Pp. 192. $27.50
(Paperback).
Kellen R. Funk3
A pious fan once asked the humorist Mark Twain if he
believed in infant baptism. (To preview themes to come: Even the
most liberal individual likes to know her faith is shared in
community.) “Believe in it?” he exclaimed in response, “Hell, I’ve
seen it done!”4
Although it may be only mildly humorous (though I confess
laughing every time I hear it), there is a profound turn in the
playful substitution of physical facts for theological truths in the
ambiguity of “belief.” At first, the inversion looks like a dodge. A
difficult and highly fraught question of Christian theology, one
over which communities have been torn and blood has been shed,5
turns at once into a seemingly simple question of observation, like
whether one can believe in the unicorn or the platypus. The
1. William Robertson Coe Professor of History and American Studies Emeritus,
Stanford University.
2. Provost Professor in the Department of Religious Studies and Co-Director of the
Center for Religion and the Human, Indiana University Bloomington, and Affiliated
Professor of Law, Indiana University Bloomington Maurer School of Law.
3. Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
4. The authenticity of the interview is argued in TOM QUIRK, MARK TWAIN AND
HUMAN NATURE 1–2 (2013).
5. See, e.g., Brad S. Gregory, Anabaptist Martyrdom: Imperatives, Experience, and
Memorialization, in A COMPANION TO ANABAPTISM AND SPIRITUALISM, 1521–1700, at
467 (John D. Roth & James M. Stayer eds., 2007).
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implicit threat behind the question—that an errant answer will
sunder fellowship in the here and now, and forfeit life in the world
to come—is apparently disarmed, violence exchanged for laugher,
swords beaten into ploughshares.
But sit a moment with the humorist’s answer and it becomes
far less clear that one is watching a simple dodge. In a way,
Twain’s joke anticipates the course of late-nineteenth century
religious ethnography and neatly encapsulates in a line the upshot
of William James’s The Will to Believe and related writings: first
observe the rite, in order to grasp the faith (or be grasped by it).6
The threat of the question is thrown back on the inquirer. Start
with the fact that millions of Christians have observed this rite
over thousands of years, most with the steady confidence that they
were performing the will of the one true God for their lives. If you
don’t believe in infant baptism, how do you account for this
massive fact of human experience?7 If one were to tackle the
fraught theology of infant baptism, a good place to start is seeing
it done.
Moreover, the joke works only because it involves a rite like
baptism, a rite that can be experienced, even if not believed. In
baptism, Christian belief engages the world of the material stuff.
People gather to bear witness; the waters are moved.8 And there
the complications of experience arise. The water must come from
somewhere. The persons celebrating the baptism either do or do
not have the legal authorization to access, possess, or even own
the material stuff that makes up the rite. Baptism, in short, is a
propertied rite, one that ultimately depends on the property rights
of the corporate body performing the ritual act. Experience turns
out to be a much more complicated affair than mere belief.
Over the last decade, a certain skepticism has confronted the
6. See William James, The Will to Believe, in 5 THE NEW WORLD 327 (Charles
Carroll Everett et al. eds., Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1896); WILLIAM JAMES, What Makes
a Life Significant, in ON SOME OF LIFE’S IDEALS 47 (1900). On the experiential shape of
James’s study of American religious experience, see LINCOLN A. MULLEN, THE CHANCE
OF SALVATION: A HISTORY OF CONVERSION IN AMERICA 270–85 (2017). On the course
of late-nineteenth-century religious ethnography, see TERENCE KEEL, DIVINE
VARIATIONS: HOW CHRISTIAN THOUGHT BECAME RACIAL SCIENCE (2018); HENRY
YU, THINKING ORIENTALS: MIGRATION, CONTACT, AND EXOTICISM IN MODERN
AMERICA (2001).
7. As a credobaptist myself, I think there are good answers, but I appreciate the
force of the question.
8. For a potent description of this material engagement, see MARILYNNE
ROBINSON, GILEAD 63 (2004).
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field of law-and-religion, targeting in particular the First
Amendment’s guarantee that no law shall abridge the free
expression of religion.9 Books with titles like The Impossibility of
Religious Freedom and especially The Myth of American
Religious Freedom have challenged not just the practices of free
exercise doctrine but the very notion that religious expression is
protected or protectable on equal terms in a liberal republic.10 A
cottage industry of what we might call Neo-Madisonian argument
has arisen in response, some of it more historically inflected than
the rest, but all contending that the basic framework of religious
rights in the liberal tradition can and does succeed at protecting
the fundamental autonomy of individuals while keeping the peace
between communities.11 While most of this conversation has been
carried on by lawyers for lawyers, two recent works offer us the
historians’ approach to these questions. While coming to radically
different conclusions, each takes the question of whether one can
believe in American religious freedom and shows the ways each
author has seen it done.
This Essay reviews Jack Rakove’s Beyond Belief, Beyond
Conscience and Winnifred Fallers Sullivan’s Church State

9. Of course, by its terms the First Amendment binds only Congress, but its
incorporation against all government institutions state and federal is now well established.
For a leading study of the Religion Clauses, see KENT GREENAWALT, 1 RELIGION AND
THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS (2006); KENT GREENAWALT, 2
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008). On the
history of the incorporation of the Amendment, see SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES AND THE CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA
(2010).
10. DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2010);
WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2007).
The theological tenets of legal secularism have long been recognized. For examples from
widely differing perspectives, see TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR:
CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY (2003); JOSEPH BOTTUM, AN ANXIOUS AGE: THE
POST-PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICA (2014); LARRY SIEDENTOP,
INVENTING THE INDIVIDUAL: THE ORIGINS OF WESTERN LIBERALISM (2014); John
Finnis, On the Practical Meaning of Secularism, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491 (1998).
11. See, e.g., Stephanie H. Barclay, First Amendment “Harms,” 95 IND. L.J. 331
(2020); JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH
DEEP DIFFERENCE (2016); NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN
AGE (2017); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2010); NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD:
AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT (2006).
I do not mean to indicate that all of these titles are responses to the skeptics of legal
secularism or religious neutrality, but despite their many different prescriptions, each in its
way contends for the workability of the basic structure of federal Religion Clause
jurisprudence.
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Corporation with an eye towards the complex management of
religious property in U.S. constitutional doctrine. Part I
summarizes Rakove’s book and highlights its value in the context
of recent scholarship on early American legislative theory. Part II
critiques Rakove’s turn from description towards advocacy of
James Madison’s liberal protestant political theology. Part III
summarizes Sullivan’s book as a particularly potent rebuttal to
Rakove’s. Part IV takes up Sullivan’s method to consider the most
recent crisis of religious property before the Supreme Court, that
of government lockdowns in the Covid-19 pandemic. Part V
concludes.
I. CONSCIENCE IS THE MOST SACRED OF ALL
PROPERTY: RAKOVE’S MADISONIAN FAITH
Jack N. Rakove’s Beyond Belief, Beyond Conscience opens
by announcing the twin postulates that made Madison and
Jefferson “radical” legislators (the latter sometimes receives
equal casting, sometimes plays a bit part). First, “[f]reedom of
conscience and the public expression of religious beliefs were
natural rights that every individual owned, just as they owned
their property” (p. 2). Second, government was limited to the
powers delegated by the sovereign people, and therefore “there
were areas of human activity that its lawmaking power could not
reach” (p. 2). In the “view from Montpelier and Monticello,”
religious freedom “was the most liberal right of all,” as “[r]eligion
was a wholly private matter, a duty to be discharged by
autonomous individuals and the voluntary religious associations
(call them churches, synagogues, congregations, or meetings)
where worshippers gathered” (pp. 2–3). Rakove announces that
the purpose of the book “will be less concerned with critiquing
judicial notions of religious freedom” than with exploring the
“conditions and tensions embodied in our historical experience”
surrounding Madison’s ideas (pp. 5–6).
To help us appreciate the radicalism of these ideas,
particularly as compared to religious toleration in the Old World,
Rakove’s first two chapters tour through European and early
American styles of toleration. The central point, Rakove tells us,
is that the traditional “practice of tolerance meant having to
shoulder an offensive burden” (pp. 13–14). Tolerance did not
mean that one could accepet a disagreeable idea but precisely that
one could not, but was going to endure its presence in civil society
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anyway. To be tolerated was to be simultaneously marked as
odious.12 The first chapter offers a brief chronicle of Europe’s
stumbling attempts towards and reversals away from modes of
tolerance. In the main, Rakove summarizes, “[r]eligion was too
important a matter, too much an element of state policy, to be
treated as a personal right that ordinary individuals simply or
naturally possessed” (p. 22).
In excavating this history, Rakove finds two early stirrings
towards American-style religious freedom. The first was the
elevation of individual conscience among radical sects of Baptists,
Anabaptists, and Quakers. Despite harsh repression and
persecution of these sects, Rakove concludes that “[o]nce
released, the genie of conscience and the desire to lead a religious
life consistent with one’s moral commitments could not be
restrained” (p. 29). The second source was the writings of John
Locke, which Rakove is careful to note were more exemplary of
thought at the time rather than the one original source of it. The
key move in Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration (“the one with
the greatest constitutional significance” (p. 37)) was the
separation of religious and temporal spheres, the severance of
“the Business of Civil Government from that of Religion.”13
In Locke’s schema, religion concerned private beliefs on
which turned one’s destiny in the world to come. To civil
government belonged everything else in the here and now. On the
one side: individual belief; on the other: the literal commonwealth
of life, liberty, and especially property. Rakove notes in passing
that Locke’s division had “a fundamentally Christian, even
Protestant character” (p. 37). One might say especially Protestant
(if one could not settle on a more precisely sectarian label). We
will return to the point later, but it suffices to note for now that
the separate spheres of private belief with eternal consequences
and temporal conduct in a desacralized world of property and
regulation is ineluctably a theological (and contestable)
proposition.
In the American colonies, the tense dynamics of European
toleration played out along similar lines, Rakove suggests, with
12. See ALEXANDRA WALSHAM, CHARITABLE HATRED: TOLERANCE AND
INTOLERANCE IN ENGLAND, 1500–1700 (2006); Andrew R. Murphy, Tolerance,
Toleration, and the Liberal Tradition, 29 POLITY 593 (1997).
13. JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 7, 12–15 (Mark Goldie ed., 2010).
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the notable difference that sectarian Protestants had a much freer
rein without the constant engagement with and contestation over
Catholic iconography that distracted their overseas counterparts
(pp. 44–45). The final set piece to prepare the stage for Madison
and Jefferson was, in Rakove’s accounting, the Great Awakening.
The proliferation of dissenting sects through conversion put the
established churches on the defensive, ironically moving
Anglicans by the end to demand toleration for “the detested
prerogatives of an established church” (p. 64). Furthermore,
“[b]ecause so many of these preachers [during the Awakening]
taught a Gospel of conversion nurtured by Baptist or Methodist
convictions, they made every individual’s claims for a sovereignty
of conscience a paramount concern” (p. 65). Thus, both of the
radical innovations that would flow from Madison’s pen were
prefigured and grounded in an increasingly liberalized Protestant
theology of conversion. “Liberty of conscience mattered to
Americans,” Rakove concludes, “because that was something
they were routinely urged to exercise, and to treat as a right they
could never alienate” (p. 65). Believe in the sovereign individual
conscience? By the 1780s, Rakove argues, Americans had already
seen it done.
***
The heart of the book is its central chapter, on Madison and
Jefferson’s “Great Project” to disestablish the Anglican church
and to constitutionalize religious liberty. Unsurprisingly, the
chapter is the book’s strongest, brimming with insights and
reading like a guided tour of the times from Mr. Madison himself.
Rakove deftly leads his readers through the often confusing array
of debates and legislation in Revolution-era Virginia, illustrating
the subtle differences between Jefferson and Madison and
showing how the latter’s thought could evolve and expand as the
political occasion allowed. The central achievement of Jefferson
and Madison, the chapter contends, was, first, to wed the
Protestant valorization of individual conscience with the
revolutionary impulse to sunder state support of religion and,
second, to elevate this union to the level of constitutional
principle.
Rakove begins in 1774, when Madison denounced the
imprisonment of Baptists for illegal preaching and Jefferson
received their petition for relief in the legislature. That episode
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formed the backdrop to the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights,
whose religion article Madison principally drafted and revised.
Where Madison’s first draft “shifted the discussion of religious
freedom from a toleration yielded by the community to the idea
of an inherent right possessed by all” (pp. 72–73) and sought to
dismantle the legal establishment of the Church of England,
subsequent drafts had to abandon the latter aim (for the
moment). Also abandoned were limiting clauses proposed by
Madison (“unless the preservation of equal liberty and the
existence of the State are manifestly endangered”) and Jefferson
(permitting the prosecution of “seditious behavior.”) (p. 73).
Ultimately, the Declaration’s final article concluded that
“religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator . . . can be
directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence;
and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion . . . .”14
In the 1786 Statute for Religious Freedom, as Rakove
narrates, Jefferson finally accomplished the disestablishment
Madison had sought twelve years before. By relieving people
from state-compelled support of “any religious worship, place, or
ministry whatsoever,” the Statute effectively “disestablished”
religion, as Rakove puts it, and eliminated “heretical or merely
heterodox ideas” as legally cognizable concepts (pp. 77, 79).
But as Rakove points out, what one legislature could
disestablish, the next could re-establish. Marking the problems for
religious liberty posed by the nature of early republican
legislation is one of this volume’s chief contributions, one likely
to be missed by law-and-religion scholars mining the record for
quotations to deploy in court briefs.15 “Whole chapters could be
written about” the Statute in the context of early American
legislation, Rakove notes (p. 78). While not developed in this
volume, some of those possible chapters are hinted at throughout.
For instance, Rakove observes that most legislation in the
eighteenth century was not “conceived [of] as broad statements of
public policy” but rather stemmed from ad hoc answers to
“petitions and requests coming from individuals and
14. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. XVI.
15. For an admirable exception, see Stephanie H. Barclay, The Historical Origins of
Judicial Religious Exemptions, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55 (2020) (exploring practices of
equitable statutory interpretation in the Early Republic that may have substituted for early
practices of religious exemptions).
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communities” (p. 79). Legal historians have recently turned their
attention in earnest to the quasi-juridical character of early
American legislatures and the significant role of petitions in
shaping policy and giving voice to some legally and socially
ostracized minorities.16 Rakove’s chapter tantalizingly invites us
to think further about religious freedom within the context of this
back-and-forth dialogue between legislators and their legally
disfavored petitioners.
The quotidian nature of legislation raised further problems.
Although some political theorists were grasping their way towards
the notion that certain rights were fundamental, none had yet
articulated a theory that certain statutes were more fundamental
than others. For Jefferson, a “constitution” was defined not by its
inherent superiority to ordinary legislation, but rather by the
cumbersome or extraordinary procedures required to amend it.
Given the endless revisability of statutory law, Rakove argues,
Jefferson and Madison could only hope that their declarations
and statutes had an educative effect: or, to put it another way, an
altar call. Rather than an unalterable declaration of pre-existing
rights, the Virginians’ legislation was a call to believe.17
That such a call could be declined was the threat against
which Madison deployed his famous Memorial and
Remonstrance. Having eliminated state support for the Anglican
Church specifically, the Virginia legislature considered a proposal
to support religious bodies generally with an assessment that
could be distributed to churches without preferential treatment
by the state. Rakove suggests that Madison’s rejoinder has been
misread as an early assertion of the theory that religious
expression deserves exemption from certain generally applicable
laws.18 Although Madison wrote that religious “duty is precedent,
16. See Kristin A. Collins, “Petitions Without Number”: Widows’ Petitions and the
Early Nineteenth-Century Origins of Public Marriage-Based Entitlements, 31 L. & HIST.
REV. 1 (2013); Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State,
127 YALE L.J. 1538 (2018); Jane Caroline Manners, Congress and the Problem of
Legislative Discretion, 1790–1870 (Nov. 17, 2018) (PhD dissertation, Princeton
University), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3344925.
17. See also Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J.
246 (2017) (arguing that Founding Era elites held to a view of natural rights that were
expansive in scope but weak in determinate legal effects); Farah Peterson, Expounding the
Constitution, 130 YALE L.J. 2 (2020) (showing that early American statesmen applied
stricter textual tests to “private” statutes and equitable, purposive tests to “public”
statutes).
18. Rakove takes particular aim at Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and

FUNK 36:1

2021]

7/6/2021 11:13 PM

BOOK REVIEWS

183

both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of
Civil Society,”19 Rakove contends that Madison was too much a
disciple of Locke and his philosophy of education to believe that
children’s minds could form religious opinions before those same
children were subject to all manner of civic duties and
obligations.20 Instead, Rakove argues, Madison’s unfortunately
phrased rebuttal was meant not to establish the superiority of
religion over secular law, but rather the anterior quality of
religious conviction that formed in the mind before citizens acted
in the public square (pp. 82–85). As thought precedes conduct, so
duties of thought can precede duties of conduct. But for Rakove,
as for Madison, duties of thought that arise from religion need
not—and in republican society, cannot—control duties of conduct
established by secular law.
The Memorial left open two related questions Rakove posits
Madison was unable to answer until the further development of
his thought year later, when he crafted his contributions to the
Federalist Papers. Given that the legislature, in Madisonian
thought, was the central institution for protecting the people’s
rights, how could a majority be checked in its attempt to oppress
a religious minority? And how could any check endure if one
legislature could succeed another and overturn its prior acts?
Madison’s first solution, developed by 1787, was his
factionalism thesis, best known from Federalist No. 51. By
recognizing freedom of conscience, the state would encourage
diverse consciences to proliferate in ways that would naturally
stifle the formation of an oppressive majority.21 The second
solution Rakove locates in Madison’s 1792 Essay on Property.
Where years earlier Madison had surmised that the free exercise
of religion “is held by the same tenure with all our other rights,”
Madison now declared that man “has a property of peculiar value
in his religious opinions.” In an intriguing passage, Madison
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990), an
article that becomes a part of Rakove’s story in Chapter 5 (see below).
19. JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, in
8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (1785).
20. On Lockean philosophy and contemporary debates about the spiritual and civic
responsibilities of children, see HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN,
LAW, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY (2005).
21. Some have read into Madison’s multiplicity-of-sects idea a general antipathy to
religion itself and a hope that pluralism would in essence cancel itself out. See Thomas
Lindsay, James Madison on Religion and Politics: Rhetoric and Reality, 85 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1321 (1991).
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turned the question of property rights on its head: “In a word, as
a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally
said to have a property in his rights.” And among those rights,
“[c]onscience is the most sacred of all property.”22
Rakove insists that we do not read too much into the Essay.
By emphasizing the propertied nature of the rights of conscience,
Madison was not coming to trust in courts as the protectors of
rights. He still “doubted that courts would have the temerity to
enforce these protections against the political will of a dominant
legislature and the impassioned popular majority it represented”
(p. 94). Nor was it apparent that conscience-as-property solved
the revisability problem posed by the legislative process. It was by
no means clear whether property had a pre-political definition or
could be defined and redefined by legislation, and the same
legislature that imposed restraints on alienation today could
revise those restraints tomorrow.23
In the end, Rakove tells us, Madison came to understand his
various declarations and bills of rights as so many articles of faith.
Rakove doesn’t use that particular term, but he insists that
Madison’s solution to the revisability problem was to repeatedly,
forcefully, and simply declare the freedom of conscience, trusting
that over time—as Madison himself put it—“fundamental maxims
of free Government, [will] become incorporated with the national
sentiment.”24 Like a creed, the proclamation of rights would
“inculcat[e] norms and attitudes that would mitigate the evils of
religious prejudice” (p. 94). In this instance, faith would have to
come before sight.
Rakove concludes the central chapter by summing up the
differences between Madison and Jefferson, apparently so that he

22. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, in 8
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 304 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (1785);
James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 266, 266–67 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
23. On the undefined nature of property in the Constitution of 1789, including in
paradigmatic cases of “takings,” see Paul J. Larkin Jr., The Original Understanding of
“Property” in the Constitution, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2016); William Michael Treanor, The
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
782 (1995); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither
Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630 (1988).
24. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 298 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds.,
1977).
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can shed Jefferson from the later narrative.25 Jefferson spent four
pivotal years “in Paris observing the abuse of power by an
absolutist monarchy, while Madison was sorting out the vices of
republican government [i.e., venal and amateur legislators] at
home” (p. 93). Jefferson hoped that free and honest religious
debate would convert all Americans to a shared religion of liberal
Protestant Unitarianism. The record “only evinces Madison’s
conviction that religious matters should remain deeply personal
and private” (p. 71). Jefferson was comfortable with laws
punishing sabbath-breaking, while Madison was not. But both
were committed Lockeans and, as Rakove insists numerous times,
both were “fundamentally Protestant” in their orientation
towards the sovereignty of the conscience and the severability of
belief from conduct (pp. 37, 78).26
***
In the fourth and fifth chapters, Rakove attempts to
synthesize recent scholarship on nineteenth- and twentiethcentury collisions of church and state and the resulting case law.
The driving concern is to show how subsequent events showcased
the genius of Madison’s approach by way of both positive and
negative examples. Invoking Nathan O. Hatch’s well-known
Democratization of American Christianity,27 Rakove suggests that
the entrepreneurial evangelicals of the so-called Second Great
Awakening showed that Madison was spot on in his expectations
that disestablishment and the sovereignty of the individual
conscience would lead not to the demise but to the flowering of
religious liberty and enthusiasm. What Madison did not
anticipate, however, was the coalescence of what David Sehat
calls the “moral establishment.”28 While evangelical associations
splintered endlessly over doctrine,29 it turned out they could make
25. Jefferson reappears at points of contestation over the religious education of
children, including Rakove’s narration of Board of Education v. Minor (pp. 123–24), and
the twentieth-century cases concerning compelled patriotism, Bible-reading, and prayer
(pp. 158–61).
26. Rakove’s argument accords with a burgeoning literature that traces the
genealogy of secularism to Protestant theology. See supra note 10.
27. NATHAN O. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY
(1989).
28. SEHAT, supra note 10, at 285.
29. The Dictionary of Christianity in America reports that, by the twentieth century,
over 20,000 unique Protestant denominations had formed in the United States.
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common cause politically to pass a host of religiously inflected
regulations—on Sabbatarianism, blasphemy, and the prohibition
of lotteries, liquor, and prostitution.30
Rakove isn’t entirely clear on how the formation of moral
establishments should affect our evaluation of Madison’s
program. Just as Madison’s thesis on the multiplicity of sects
failed to anticipate the rise and integration of political parties in
the United States,31 his entirely correct prediction that religious
dissenters would proliferate did not lead to a natural condition
that made religious coercion impossible in a liberal society.
Rakove is dismissive of Madison’s oversight, arguing that
Madison’s liberalism remains a fundamentally sound guide to
American religious freedom. So long as we “make the free
exercise of religion as private an activity as possible, and
remember that the great objective of protecting religion was to
secure the minority against the majority,” Rakove concludes,
Madison’s thought provides us other tools for defanging a
religious establishment (p. 128).
The two late nineteenth-century cases that prove this,
according to Rakove, are Board of Education v. Minor and
Reynolds v. United States, a surprising choice of just-so stories to
illustrate the genius of American religious freedom. Minor was
litigated in Cincinnati, heartland of the “Bible Wars” in which
Catholic school children were harassed and sometimes beaten
when they did not participate in Protestant prayer and Bible
reading.32 By the late 1860s, the exodus of Catholics to parochial
schools had become so extensive the Cincinnati board of
education prohibited Bible reading entirely, hoping to attract
Catholics back into the public school system. The Ohio Supreme
Court narrowly affirmed the school board’s decision (holding, in
a passage not remarked by Rakove, that Bible reading in schools
was for the legislature and not the courts to regulate).
Reynolds involved the federal antipolygamy prosecution of a

DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA (Robert D. Linder, Daniel G. Reid, Bruce
L. Shelley & Harry S. Stout eds., 1991).
30. See, e.g., JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION (2014).
31. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2007).
32. Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872). See STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE,
THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2012).
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Latter-day Saint living in the Utah Territory.33 In its first
application of the Free Exercise Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that the Clause protected only belief and not conduct,
thereby affirming Reynold’s conviction and sentence for acting on
his belief in the divine sanction of plural marriage. Commentators
have sometimes seen both Minor and Reynolds as low points in
the history of American religious freedom, the moments at which
the mask slipped and the illiberalism of the de facto liberal
Protestant establishment shone through.34 Rakove admits that
neither resulted in a happy consensus, but on the whole he
celebrates these cases for “[k]eeping faith” with Madison’s creed
(pp. 128–29).
Rakove continues to keep the score on those following the
faith of Madison in his survey of twentieth-century cases in the
book’s final chapter. First up is the Court’s well-known
turnaround on the compulsion of Jehovah’s Witnesses to salute
the American flag in school. The Court sustained the compulsion
in Gobitis only to overrule itself three years later in Barnette.35
Rakove observes that “Gobitis remains an anomalously strained
decision that one struggles to defend,” just after offering a pretty
sturdy defense along Madisonian lines: “No one was asking the
Gobitas36 children to abandon their beliefs; all the school board
wanted was to have them engage in an activity supporting the
patriotic ethos on which the protection of American liberties
ultimately depended” (p. 148). Indeed, one could hardly object
that compelled patriotic conduct without compelled belief runs
33. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON,
THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002).
34. See, e.g., Danielle N. Boaz, Practices “Odious Among the Northern and Western
Nations of Europe”: Whiteness and Religious Freedom in the United States, in RELATING
WORLDS OF RACISM: DEHUMANISATION, BELONGING, AND THE NORMATIVITY OF
EUROPEAN WHITENESS 39 (Philomena Essed et al. eds., 2019) (tracing twentieth-century
echoes of Reynolds in cases preserving European norms and casting doubt on claimants’
beliefs); TISA WENGER, WE HAVE A RELIGION: THE 1920S PUEBLO INDIAN DANCE
CONTROVERSY AND AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 153–55 (2009) (chronicling the
Bureau of Indian Affairs’ reliance on Reynolds to suppress Indian rites and uphold a de
facto Protestant establishment); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE 360–75 (2002) (arguing that Protestant nativism underlay the secular separation of
church and state in restrictions of Bible reading in schools).
35. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
36. The official caption in the Supreme Court reporter misspells the name. See
SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION
AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 9 n.17 (2000).
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afoul of the Madisonian creed. Nevertheless, Rakove insists that
Madison’s partiality for persecuted minorities against majority
factions shows that Barnette is the properly orthodox ruling (pp.
147–49).
Next up is another pair of cases involving the Jehovah’s
Witnesses, Cantwell and Chaplinsky. In the one, the Supreme
Court overturned a conviction for breaching the peace by
proselytizing; in the other, the Court sustained the conviction.37
The fact that the latter case is often regarded a “free speech”
rather than a “free exercise” case Rakove regards as a positive
development. It trends in the direction of “privacy of religious
belief and behavior, minimizing the need for the state to deal with
religion at all” (p. 153). The subsuming of religious speech into
the general rights of free speech (and its exceptions, like
Chaplinsky’s “fighting words”) lowers the temperature, turning
“[a]dherents of ardent religious beliefs” into ordinary purveyors
of objectionable speech (pp. 151–53).
The chapter concludes with a brief account of the “RFRA
cycle,” as Rakove narrates the landmark religious exemption
cases that led to Smith, Smith’s repudiation in the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, and the twists and turns in the
Supreme Court’s application of that statute.38 Rakove’s colleague
and occasional conversation partner, Michael McConnell, is a
major character steering the courts towards the recognition of
religious exemptions as a historical imperative, a position Rakove
forcefully argues lacks a basis in Madisonian thought or the
framing of early American religious freedom statutes.39 Rakove
offers his narrative not as a “definitive history” (p. 174) of the
RFRA cycle, but mainly to argue that religious exemptions from
generally applicable laws would violate the Madisonian
imperative that belief must be regarded separately from conduct.
After wrestling with the Hobby Lobby decision for some pages,
Rakove concludes that the owners of Hobby Lobby should have
to keep their theologies of human life a matter of private opinion,
and comply with the mandates of the Affordable Care Act (pp.

37. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942).
38. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4).
39. See McConnell, supra note 18; MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY &
THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2006).
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175–76, 180–81).40
The book closes by leaving us with a rule of thumb in
applying Madison’s thought, which Rakove terms “Madison’s
Razor.” Recognizing some tensions between equal rights of
conscience and unequal duties to obey generally applicable laws,
as well as the failure of Madison’s multiplicity-of-sects thesis to
neutralize majoritarian moral establishments, Rakove advises
that we recognize two principles as the core of Madison’s thought
and the essence of our liberal creed: “First, the more we treat
religion as a matter of private belief . . . the better off we will be,”
and “[s]econd, the more we allow the spheres of church and state
to overlap, . . . the greater danger we run” (pp. 184–185). The
sovereignty of the individual conscience and the principle of
disestablishment together form “a happy formula for civic peace”
(p. 185).
II. MADISON’S RAZOR AND THE SWORD OF
DAMOCLES: THE LIBERAL BARGAIN OF AN
UNPROPERTIED FAITH
For a slender volume covering well-trod ground, Beyond
Belief, Beyond Conscience offers several clear and original
insights. It situates Madison’s (and to a lesser extent, Jefferson’s)
thought within the context of an evolving American Protestantism
without getting caught up in the intractable debate of whether
America was “founded as a Christian nation.”41 It provides
confident guidance to the developing thought of one of the great
complex thinkers of the Founding Era. The debate over originalist
understandings of religious exemptions under the Free Exercise
Clause will have to contend with Rakove’s deeply contextual
arguments about the nature of eighteenth-century legislation,
which so often consisted of ad hoc provisional and endlessly
revisable statements of unclear legal force.
Rakove’s analysis is particularly rich as he sets the context to

40. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). Rakove’s conclusion
on Hobby Lobby is in some tension with his reading of Gobitis and Barnette. On the one
hand, the imperatives of the Affordable Care Act regulate conduct and not belief; but on
the other, a religious minority (depending on how one interprets the demographics) was,
in all three cases, complaining about the repression by a majority faction.
41. For a valiant attempt to retire the debate on clear terms and an assessment of the
equivocal evidence, see JOHN FEA, WAS AMERICA FOUNDED AS CHRISTIAN NATION? A
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION (2011).
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Madison’s famous declaration that “[c]onscience is the most
sacred of all property” (p. 90). Rakove shows that for Madison,
the transubstantiation of conscience, and indeed religion, into
property provided an initial answer to the problem of revisable
legislation, offering believers a kind of “tenure” they could assert
in the familiar legal language by which all tenures were defended.
Moreover, Rakove shows the thoroughly Lockean understanding
of Madison’s religion-as-tenure, one which conformed neatly to
Locke’s separation of the world into spiritual and civil, individual
and public, sacred and secular spaces. For Madison, the
conscience was the only religious property there was—
inalienable, but also immaterial. The rest of the world of property
belonged to the civil authorities.
Rakove tells us in a footnote he regularly wears the
conscience-as-property slogan on a t-shirt (p. 197 n.29), but this
particular habit of liberalism (pun intended) is where problems
arise, as Rakove shifts the narrative from description of Madison’s
thought to a call to faith (intended literally). The separation of
religion from civic space and regulation is, of course, not only a
contestable proposition but a squarely theological one. While
Rakove appreciates that certain liberal strands of Protestantism
contributed to Madison’s thought, he appears not to appreciate
the implication of this genealogy: Madisonian-style religious
freedom, taken seriously, consists only in the freedom to live like
a liberal Protestant.
The identification of American secularism with Protestant
genealogies is sometimes asserted without theological precision,
so it is worth pausing to consider the swirl of theologies that make
possible—that make believable—the twin prongs of what Rakove
calls “Madison’s Razor.” Thousands of denominations of all kinds
of organization and theological commitments come under the
banner of Protestantism, and very few sects would affirm all
points of the Madisonian faith.42 Many Protestants, especially
Baptists, denied the very existence of sacraments and indeed
sought to strip away from worship all sensual elements—
pejoratively, the “smells and bells” of Catholicism—but
42. For an overview of the Christian topography of the early United States, see E.
BROOKS HOLIFIELD, THEOLOGY IN AMERICA: CHRISTIAN THOUGHT FROM THE AGE OF
THE PURITANS TO THE CIVIL WAR (2003); MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA’S GOD: FROM
JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM LINCOLN (2002); SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A
RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1972).
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Lutherans, Anglicans, and Presbyterians retained sacramental
liturgies.43 The Madisonian faith prefers the Baptists.
While some millenarians thought they could hasten the ageto-come by explosive revolutions in the here and now,44 and the
Mormons developed a robust theology of a re-founded Kingdom
of Heaven on earth,45 others increasingly put their hopes in a
disembodied spiritualized heaven that remained impassive to
temporal politics, singing hymns of being “called up yonder.”46
The Madisonian faith prefers the hymnists.
Firebrand revivalists like Charles Finney developed
sophisticated theologies of complicity with sin that showed how
the individual abolitionist’s soul could nevertheless be tainted
with the sin of a nation.47 Moral theologians founded the right of
revolution on the violation of a Christian oath.48 The Calvinists
committed regicide long before it became popular among French
liberals.49 The Madisonian faith prefers, well, none of these
43. A generation of scholarship bluntly divided Jacksonian Christianity into broadly
evangelical camps of Whigs and “liturgical” Democrats. More recent scholarship has
attended to religious demography and ethnocultural studies with more precision. See
RICHARD J. CARWARDINE, EVANGELICALS AND POLITICS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA
(1993); D.G. Hart, Mainstream Protestantism, “Conservative” Religion, and Civil Society,
13 J. POL’Y. HIST. 19 (2009).
44. See PAUL E. JOHNSON & SEAN WILENTZ, THE KINGDOM OF MATTHIAS: A
STORY OF SEX AND SALVATION IN 19TH-CENTURY AMERICA (1995).
45. See CLAUDIA LAUPER BUSHMAN & RICHARD LYMAN BUSHMAN, BUILDING
THE KINGDOM: A HISTORY OF MORMONS IN AMERICA (2001); BENJAMIN E. PARK,
KINGDOM OF NAUVOO: THE RISE AND FALL OF A RELIGIOUS EMPIRE ON THE
AMERICAN FRONTIER (2020). For an intriguing counter-reading of early Mormonism as
theological critique of American imperialism, see PETER COVIELLO, MAKE YOURSELVES
GODS: MORMONS AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF AMERICAN SECULARISM (2019).
46. See MATTHEW AVERY SUTTON, AMERICAN APOCALYPSE: A HISTORY OF
MODERN EVANGELICALISM (2017); Caleb J.D. Maskell, Secularism, Synthesis, and
Antebellum Evangelical Self-Understanding, 84 CHURCH HIST. 616 (2015). For an
alternative reading, one that credits evangelicals more than the Transcendentalists for
Americans’ turn to nature for a theology of immanence, see BRETT MALCOLM
GRAINGER, CHURCH IN THE WILD: EVANGELICALS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (2019).
47. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. YOUNG, BEARING WITNESS AGAINST SIN: THE
EVANGELICAL BIRTH OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT (2006); W. CALEB
MCDANIEL, THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SLAVERY: GARRISONIAN
ABOLITIONISTS AND TRANSATLANTIC REFORM 159 (2013).
48. See WILLIAM WHEWELL, 2 THE ELEMENTS OF MORALITY: INCLUDING POLITY
87–88 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1845). On the early political theology of oathtaking in
America, see Jud Campbell, Testimonial Exclusions and Religious Freedom in Early
America, 37 L. & HIST. REV. 431 (2019).
49. See DAVID R. COMO, RADICAL PARLIAMENTARIANS AND THE ENGLISH CIVIL
WAR (2018); BLAIR WORDEN, GOD’S INSTRUMENTS: POLITICAL CONDUCT IN THE
ENGLAND OF OLIVER CROMWELL (2012); NICHOLAS TYACKE, ANTI-CALVINISTS: THE
RISE OF ENGLISH ARMINIANISM C.1590–1640 (1990).
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Calvinists certainly. One could go on,50 but hopefully it is clear
enough how highly specific, and specifically constrained, are the
allowable theologies of the Madisonian state.51
Perhaps for these reasons, the Virginian’s political theology
seems not to have been particularly influential in practice across
the American states, despite Rakove’s assessment that Madison
gifted them the “founding principles of American
constitutionalism” and the best approach to free religious
expression (p. 100). Virginia may have persisted in treating the
individual conscience as the only kind of religious property in
existence, but most other states took a different tack.52 The legal
structure that did far more to govern religious expression was a
contribution of New York’s, in its statute granting general
incorporation rights to all religious societies.53 Rakove addresses
the statute and church property disputes that arose under it in his
chapter on entrepreneurial democratization of American religion,
but doing so tends to give the impression that general
incorporation was an outgrowth of Madisonian liberalism and a
textbook example of how Madison’s approach encouraged the
proliferation of contending sects (pp. 111–117). Instead, New
York recognized the power of religious entities to hold and
dispose of property for religious purposes in 1784, predating both
Virginia’s Statute for Religious Freedom and Madison’s
Memorial and Remonstrance. And while Virginia, alone among
the states, denied corporate formation to religious bodies, almost
every other state outside New England followed New York to the
letter, including the newly formed states that made up the
heartland of the Revival.54
50. While the history of political theology in the United States remains understudied,
the subject is receiving renewed attention, particularly from Reformation scholars. See
DAVID P. HENRECKSON, THE IMMORTAL COMMONWEALTH: COVENANT, COMMUNITY,
AND POLITICAL RESISTANCE IN EARLY REFORMED THOUGHT (2019); DAVID CHAN
SMITH, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE REFORMATION OF THE LAWS: RELIGION, POLITICS
AND JURISPRUDENCE, 1578–1616 (2014); DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THOMAS
CROMWELL: A REVOLUTIONARY LIFE (2018).
51. See J. JUDD OWEN, MAKING RELIGION SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY:
TRANSFORMATION FROM HOBBES TO TOCQUEVILLE (2015).
52. See THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: JEFFERSON’S
STATUTE IN VIRGINIA (2013).
53. See 1784 N.Y. LAWS 613–18; 1813 N.Y. LAWS 212.
54. See 1785 N.J. LAWS 255–58; Del. Laws 10–14 (1786–1787); 1790 Pa. Laws 40–43;
1796 N.C. Sess. Laws 93; 1802 Md. Laws Ch. CXI; 1805 Ga. Laws 15–16; 1811 Mass. Acts
387–89; 1813 Ky. Acts 211–12; 1817 Tenn. Pub. Acts 82; 1816 Ohio Laws 72–74; 1819 Ala.
Laws 100–01; ME. STAT. tit. 135 (1821); 1824 Ind. Acts 265–67; 1834 ILL. LAWS 147–49;
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The law of religious corporations in the early United States
was hardly a paradigm of “neutral” disentanglement of church
and state. State chancery courts all over the union took up
theological disputes and attempted to resolve them on their
merits.55 And as Sally Gordon and others have shown, the
incorporation statutes functionally forced a kind of
congregationalist, even Baptist, polity on all religious bodies by
conferring corporate status only on local congregations of limited
property holdings and governed by a plurality of trustees.56 The
Catholic church officially came to call this the “American
heresy.”57 But as I have argued elsewhere, despite these aspects
of manifest illiberalism, the religious corporation laws did open
up space for theologies that did not have the sanction of the liberal
state to nevertheless arrange and re-order the real world of
material property and to force recognition and respect for these
arrangements from the civil courts.58
Nevertheless, the history of American religious corporations
law also vividly illustrates the limits of the state’s recognition of
and respect for religious difference. As Nathan Oman has recently
written in painstaking work chronicling the corporate formation

ARK. CODE § 125 (1837); 1838 MISS. LAWS 57–58; MICH. COMP. LAWS §10.1 (1838); 1838–
1839 Wis. Sess. Laws 136. Rhode Island and Louisiana appear not to have adopted general
incorporation legislation but granted charters to all religious societies which sought them.
See 1 DAVID BENEDICT, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE BAPTIST DENOMINATION IN
AMERICA, AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD 449–50 (Boston, Lincoln & Edmands
1813); 1 A GENERAL DIGEST OF THE ACTS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF LOUISIANA 149 (L.
Moreau Lislet ed., New Orleans, Benjamin Levy 1828). In 1820, Missouri became the only
state to follow Virginia’s model by providing in its constitution that “no religious
corporation can ever be established in this state.” MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 5.
55. For a sampling of such cases in New York, see Kniskern v. Lutheran Churches, 1
Sand. Ch. 439 (N.Y. Ch. 1844); Lawyer v. Clipperly, 7 Paige Ch. 281 (N.Y. Ch. 1838); First
Baptist Church in Hartford v. Witherell, 3 Paige Ch. 296 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). For other
representative cases from New England, the Mid-Atlantic, and the South, see A FULL
REPORT OF THE CASE OF STACY DECOW, AND JOSEPH HENDRICKSON, VS. THOMAS L.
SHOTWELL (Philadelphia, P.J. Gray 1834); REPORT OF THE CASE OF EARLE VS. WOOD
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1855); Wilson v. The Presbyterian Church of John’s Island,
19 S.C. Eq. (2 Rich. Eq.) 192 (1846). For a partial list of the many other cases of this type,
see CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CIVIL LAW AND THE CHURCH (1916).
56. Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church Power
and Property Before the Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (2014); MARK DE WOLFE
HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 44–47 (1965).
57. See Gordon, supra note 56, at 351; Patrick Carey, The Laity’s Understanding of
the Trustee System, 1785–1855, 64 CATH. HIST. REV. 357, 371–72 (1978).
58. Kellen Funk, Church Corporations and the Conflict of Laws in Antebellum
America, 32 J.L. & RELIGION 263 (2017).
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of the Latter-day Saints, the laws of religious incorporation help
to correct “whiggish stories that emphasize religious freedom and
fail to recognize . . . mechanisms for controlling and coercing
churches that strayed too far from [Protestant] assumptions.”59
Indeed, while the conviction upheld in Reynolds was a serious
setback for the Saints, Mormons did not abandon their theology
of polygamy until 1890—the year the Supreme Court definitively
forfeited the Church’s main property holdings and revoked its
corporate status.60 The Court and its anti-polygamy allies in
Congress understood well what Rakove’s account seems to
overlook: that it is the rare faith that can lead a disembodied—
and dis-propertied—existence.
Rakove notes the tensions between the typical corporate
form and the official Catholic and Mormon theologies of church
governance, but he is comforted at least by the regime’s
consistency with Locke, who defined a church as “a voluntary
Society of Men, joining themselves together of their own accord”
(p. 116). And the American heresy proved highly popular,
Rakove contends, as even the Catholic laity came to enjoy their
state-compelled measure of democratic control (pp. 116–117).
That is perhaps the clearest statement in the book of the
Madisonian bargain: You are free to believe however you like in
your heart, so long as you live everyday a heretic in practice.61 As
it has turned out, conscience may be sacred and inalienable
property, but only because all other property can be forfeited to
the state. If that is granted, as it was at the height of the antiMormon crusade, then Madison’s Razor becomes apparent for
what it really is: a Sword of Damocles. Stay within the theological
lines sanctioned by the state, or your kingdom shall be broken,
and shall be scattered to the four winds. Ultimately the book’s
title becomes curious, for Rakove’s Madisonianism seems to deny
anything to religion Beyond Belief, Beyond Conscience.

59. Nathan B. Oman, “Agreeable to the Laws of Our Country”: Mormonism, Church
Corporations, and the Long Legacy of America’s First Disestablishment, 36 J.L. &
RELIGION (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4) (on file with author).
60. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1 (1890). On the connection of Late Corporation to President Woodruff’s 1890
Manifesto abjuring the doctrine of polygamy, see Ken Driggs, “Lawyers of Their Own to
Defend Them”: The Legal Career of Franklin Snyder Richards, 21 J. MORMON HIST. 84,
105–07 (1995).
61. For a powerful depiction of the “freedom” to believe while strictly conforming
one’s conduct to state decrees, see SILENCE (Paramount Pictures 2016).
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III. THE VARIETIES OF PROPERTIED RELIGIOUS
EXPERIENCE: SULLIVAN’S COMMENTARIES ON THE
COURT’S POLITICAL THEOLOGY
Church State Corporation, on the other hand, means every
word of its title. Sullivan declares in the opening pages that the
“dominant narrative” of an American religious liberty centered
on “the individual and the individual’s conscience” is everywhere
“haunt[ed]” by the collectivity and aggregate personality of “the
church and of her sovereign companions—the state and the
corporation, collectives that have legal capacities of their own that
exceed those of their members” (pp. 4–5). Where Rakove and
others have applauded the Supreme Court for grasping the basic
tenets of the Madisonian vision,62 Sullivan has written elsewhere
of her dismay that the current Supreme Court justices “know little
religious history and have no political theology.”63 Her earlier
work has addressed defects with the Court’s received history of
free expression.64 In this work, Sullivan aims to excavate the
unstated premises of the current Court’s facile public theology.
Sullivan’s introduction and first two chapters offer a close
and richly textured reading of the 2011 Term’s unanimous opinion
in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v.
EEOC, focusing on its closing line: “The church must be free to
choose those who will guide it on its way.”65 What does it mean
for the Court to invoke the definite article, she asks? What,
indeed, is the Court confessing?
Sullivan answers that “American law has shown that it
cannot think religion without the church—that the space for
religion in US law is a church-shaped space” (p. 10). Her adoption
of a Christian frame is unapologetic. While Christianity’s favored
status in American law “might be lamented, it is not disputable”
(p. 5 n.16). The Lockean, Madisonian definition of a church as a
wholly voluntary association of autonomous individuals Sullivan
discards as a legal fiction. “[R]eligion is inevitably social and
embodied and cannot accurately be reduced to individual beliefs
and associated motivated practices,” she writes (p. 15). Where
62. See Donald L. Drakeman, Reynolds v. United States: The Historical Construction
of Constitutional Reality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 697 (2004).
63. Samuel Moyn & Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Jurisdictions of the Church,
IMMANENT FRAME (Oct. 5, 2020), https://tif.ssrc.org/2020/10/05/jurisdictions-of-thechurch/.
64. See e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 10.
65. 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012).
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Rakove locates almost all civil law “beyond belief, beyond
conscience,” Sullivan locates nothing in the great beyond—all
ecclesiology implies a certain legal order, all legal orders assert an
ecclesiology in turn. What makes for a church, like a corporation
or a state, is a claim to collective sovereign action over bodies in
space, a normative and consequently rivalrous alternative that
defines its sphere of authority against its legal kin, an image
Sullivan invokes with the phrase “the church-in-law.”66
Sullivan claims to offer her work as an “experiment in taking
religion seriously without establishing it,” an experiment “in
speaking back theologically to the law” (p. 20). The line captures
both a strength and weakness of the book. Taking religion
seriously is its great strength. Few other works on Religion Clause
jurisprudence evince so thorough an understanding of Christian
ecclesiology and its deep-seated tensions with the liberal state.67
But in casting the work as an “experiment,” Sullivan hedges a bit.
One is never quite clear when her conclusions are offered
provisionally or with credal assurance. And for a lawyer, Sullivan
is surprisingly reticent about how the cases and opinions she
criticizes could or should have come out differently. If theology
speaks back to law, what would we see done?
Sullivan’s aversion to counseling the Court on remedies is
evident from her opening discussion of Hosanna-Tabor. In its
opinion, the Court ruled that Cheryl Perich, a “called” teacher in
the Evangelical Lutheran Church, was a “minister” and therefore
an employment discrimination suit against the church could not
be entertained. Should the Court have instead awarded damages,
finding that the ministerial exception did not apply, or should it
have dispensed with the exception entirely? Sullivan scolds that
“[i]f the Court is going to undertake a . . . definition of orthodoxy,
it might start by getting its theology right,” but she never quite
tells what a right theology in this case would be, or what it would
do (p. 42).68
Nevertheless, Sullivan provides a masterful explication of the

66. On the meta-jurisdictional aims of state and church sovereigns, see CÉCILE
LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION (2017), a work Sullivan engages frequently in her
book.
67. On this score, Sullivan’s book joins the enviable company of HOWE, supra note
56, and Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
68. Perhaps it would keep the case from arising in the first place. See infra text
accompanying note 94.
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theological premises of the Court’s opinion. The Chief Justice’s
opinion engages in several “sleights of hand,” she finds (p. 32). It
narrates an early modern history of royal prerogative over
(Roman Catholic and then Anglican) church offices, but then
safeguards “the freedom of the church” for a particular Lutheran
denomination that had no recognition and certainly would have
suffered legal disabilities under the very English laws the Court
valorizes (pp. 32–35). Most surprisingly, the Chief Justice Roberts
wrote that Smith’s denial of religious exemptions to generally
applicable laws “involved government regulation of only outward
physical acts,” not “government interference with an internal
church decision.”69 As Sullivan points out, this is well beyond the
Madisonian conduct-belief distinction underlying Reynolds and—
one would have thought—Smith. Certainly commissioning,
“calling,” hiring, and firing teachers counts as conduct, yet now
under the ministerial exception, Sullivan concludes, “[t]he church
requires protection that individuals do not” (p. 38).
“For the Court to make this distinction is for it to do
theology,” Sullivan argues (p. 39). It assumes that a church’s
“sovereign self-understanding has been and must be
acknowledged in US law” (p. 40). It foists upon all churches a
particular sacramental division between members and officers
that is highly contested within all major branches of Christianity,
to say nothing of non-Christian traditions (pp. 40–45). It
“juridifie[s]” the church, functionally preferring a pre-Vatican II
theology of the Body of Christ as a mediated series of offices
rather than an undifferentiated sacramental community (p. 44).
Could the Court have avoided doing bad theology if it had
adhered to Smith and subjected the Evangelical Lutheran Church
to the antidiscrimination policies of the EEOC? Sullivan implies
such a move would have merely exchanged particular Protestant
theologies for Catholic ones, a critique she makes of Justice
Alito’s concurrence (pp. 49–53). Instead, Sullivan invites us to
wonder what possibilities might arise if we spoke a different
theology entirely to law, one arising from a feminist,
“antinomian” tradition such as that espoused by Anne
Hutchinson.70 After all, the tragic irony of the Hosanna-Tabor
69. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.
70. Sullivan here cites Marie Ashe’s feminist critique of Cover, supra note 67. Marie
Ashe, Beyond Nomos and Narrative: Unconverted Antinomianism in the Work of Susan
Howe, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2006). On Anne Hutchinson and the antinomian
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case is that a church is protected by the “ministerial exception”
from a suit by someone the church would never sacramentally
recognize as an actual minister on account of her sex.71 “Is it
possible to have a nonpatriarchal theory of the church . . . ?” (p.
57). Sullivan leaves the question hanging in the air.
***
Sullivan’s second chapter follows Hosanna-Tabor’s
digression into the “church property” cases, principally Watson v.
Jones and Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.72 In both cases the
Supreme Court, as thousands of American civil courts have done
over time, was asked by private claimants to decide which faction
in a theological dispute properly owned the lands, edifice, and
other “temporalities” of a church.73 Sullivan deftly argues that
both the ministerial exception and the church property cases are
two products of the “unresolved [and unresolvable?] tension”
between the First Amendment’s two Religion Clauses (p. 60). On
the one hand, “[d]eciding who is the rightful spokesperson for the
church”—who counts as a minister, who holds the property, and,
if these things are disputed, who decides who decides—comes
“perilously close to the prohibited establishment role for
government that Americans want to avoid” (p. 60). Yet
recognizing and respecting the ecclesiastical arrangements
churches use “to enable the continuity of religious life in the
church” may also be the specific command of the Free Exercise
tradition in America, see THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, 1636–1638: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (David D. Hall ed., 2d ed. 1990); ANNE HUTCHINSON:
TROUBLER OF THE PURITAN ZION (Francis J. Bremer ed., 1981).
71. While the ordination of women to pastoral office is a subject of contention in the
Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, of which Hosanna-Tabor is a member, the official
position of the Synod since 2004 has been that women may “serve in humanly established
offices” so long as they do not perform the “distinctive functions” of the pastoral office.
The Service of Women in Congregational and Synodical Offices, Res. 3-08A,
CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS OF THE 62ND REGULAR CONVENTION OF THE LUTHERAN
CHURCH—MISSOURI SYNOD 132–33 (2004). If “minister” were straightforwardly defined
as a “pastor,” then, Ms. Perich clearly would not count. Only by deferring to
denominational definitions of ministers and their inclusion of “called” teachers like Ms.
Perich can the question of the ministerial exception even arise. On the nature of the
“called” teacher office in Hosanna-Tabor, see Brief of Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2011) (No. 10-553).
72. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
73. See HOWE, supra note 56; Gordon, supra note 56.
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Clause (p. 60).
The burden of the chapter is to once again chide the Court
for theologizing sloppily and to explicate the hidden premises of
the Court’s “belie[f] in the church” (p. 81). Here the corporation
enters the stage, as Sullivan notes that the Court’s frequent
reliance on Madison to interpret the First Amendment ignores
just how eccentric Madison’s vision was in its own time and since.
Madison’s “Commonwealth has always been an outlier among the
states” in the way it forbid the incorporation of religious bodies
and viewed “church governance as existing wholly apart from civil
law” (pp. 66–67). Outside of Virginia, however, nearly all
churches in the U.S. have been “creatures of state law” through
corporate formation (p. 68). Besides skewing the Court’s received
history, the Madisonian view would be unworkable, or at least
unsatisfying, in a case like Hosanna-Tabor, Sullivan implies,
because a wholly voluntary church would have no employees
subject to the EEOC’s rules and therefore Ms. Perich would lose
her claim anyway. So since the Madisonian theology is not the
lived religion of the church corporations or the courts who
adjudicate their disputes, what has been the official theology,
Sullivan asks?
Like the ministerial exception, the church property disputes
raise the question of how much the state ought to defer to “the”
church, but with the added complication that “by definition in
such cases, there are at least two churches at issue,” and a court
must decide “how to resolve two churches into one” (p. 69).
Sullivan argues that the Supreme Court’s theological preferences
for spotting the one true church in these cases has shifted over
time. Watson, a post-Civil War case that awarded church property
to the antislavery wing of a Kentucky Presbyterian church,
“reflect[ed a] thoroughly protestant ecclesiology” by treating a
church as a voluntary association whose members “consented to
the church’s jurisdiction” and were thus bound to the practices
and procedures of their original incorporation (pp. 72–73). But in
more recent cases, Sullivan finds a “little whiff of incense” wafting
through the Court’s ecclesiology (p. 73). In Kedroff, the midtwentieth-century Court recognized the authority of the Patriarch
of Moscow over a Russian Orthodox church in New York, state
law attempts to sever denominational control over local
congregational property notwithstanding. Sullivan argues the
decision, unlike Watson, recognized the “freedom of the
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corporeal church, not of its members” (p. 74). Despite having a
local, voluntary association of Russian Orthodox in New York,
the Court found that the state was unduly interfering with and
trampling over the Russian Orthodox theology of hierarchical
authority and unbroken lines of apostolic descent. Sullivan
concludes that the Court “bought the argument of the appellants
that the church—the hierarchical church—is a sacramental as well
as a sovereign entity entitled to extraconstitutional legal
deference” (p. 80).
Sullivan laments a “sad irony” in the way courts affirm the
authority of hierarchical churches: even in the act of declaring the
sovereignty of the church, the courts necessarily proclaim and
enact their own superior sovereignty to declare and arbitrate the
doctrine and dogma of a church (p. 82). It is somewhat unclear
what makes this irony sad. After all, unlike cases invoking the
ministerial exception, the church(es) engaged in civil property
disputes have asked the courts to arbitrate their doctrine. Or, to
use the quasi-sacramental and technical legal terms, they have
pleaded and prayed for the relief of the courts, instead of trusting
to their own sacramental authority to induce congregant loyalty
through excommunication. That is not to deny that courts
necessarily engage in theology to answer this call. At a minimum,
they agree implicitly with the church litigants that St. Paul’s
prohibition on “going to law” does not bind the churches and does
not divest the state courts of jurisdiction.74 (Perhaps this is one
occasion where American juridical theology departs from early
Baptist practices.75) Whereas state incorporation law tends to
favor a congregational ecclesiology, the courts’ doctrines of
deference, as Sullivan argues elsewhere in the chapter, tend to
make the hierarchical churches the favored churches of the law
(pp. 63–64).

74. 1 Corinthians 6:1–8. On the possible applications and potential problems with
treating this passage as a call to Christian arbitration, see Michael Corkery & Jessica SilverGreenberg, In Religious Arbitration, Scripture Is the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitrationscripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html.
75. Early Baptists not only fined their members for engaging in civil litigation, they
often prohibited members from even becoming licensed attorneys in the local polity. See
Curtis D. Johnson, The Protracted Meeting Myth: Awakenings, Revivals, and New York
State Baptists, 1789–1850, 34 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 349 (2014).
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***
How far doctrines of deference can extend is the subject of
the book’s third chapter, on Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, yet another
essay concluding with open questions and profound silences. Yet
this chapter is perhaps Sullivan’s strongest, the one that most
forcefully bears out her opening promise to take religions
seriously and speak theology back to law. While many
commentators admire Justice Ginsburg’s Madisonian dissent and
its stark separation of the world of material commerce from the
world of spiritual belief, Sullivan recognizes that even here we
find profound theological commitments. A chalice and a peace
pipe, an edifice and burial ground, a particular river or a closely
held corporation of 500 arts-and-crafts retail stores—the world
abounds in theologies that might regard all of these properties as
equally sacred, equally sanctified to do the work of religion. The
sanctity of even commercial property, Sullivan contends, has “a
long pedigree in religious history,” particularly among shades of
“low church” Protestantism (pp. 96, 118).
Of course, a major difference between Hobby Lobby and the
cases that preceded it is that those cases concerned church
corporations, usually formed under specific laws for incorporating
religious bodies, while Hobby Lobby is a closely held for-profit
corporation formed under Oklahoma’s general incorporation
laws. But “[p]henomenologically speaking,” Sullivan argues, “it is
the church that the Court recognizes in Hobby Lobby, just as it
did in Hosanna-Tabor” (p. 95). Sullivan finds in the Court’s
treatment of Hobby Lobby a parallel to the status of the East
India Company in English law, a corporation in which material
pursuits, state power, and religious ambitions (she points to the
hundreds of chaplains among the Company’s employees) marked
“a profound interchangeability among the church, the state, and
the corporation—the state and the corporation borrowing from
the church the sign of the sovereign as sacred” (p. 94). In rejecting
the dissent’s facile separation of commerce and faith, she implies,
the Court for once gets something theologically right.
But the trouble with Hobby Lobby, Sullivan finds, is that the
Court believes the faith of the store’s owners without seeing it
done. Because the Court steadfastly refuses to test the sincerity of
religious belief, it merely accepted the assertion of the owners’
theology “without reference to religious authorities or texts” (p.

FUNK 36:1

202

7/6/2021 11:13 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 36:175

100).76 Sullivan aims to do the ethnographical work the Court
assumes away. While many evangelical denominations have
robust traditions and sophisticated theologies of avoiding
“complicit[y]” with sin (pp. 171–172), Sullivan finds as a religious
historian a pretty mixed record on whether Mennonites (the
parent faith of Hobby Lobby’s owners) even regard abortion as a
sin one could be complicit in (pp. 112–117). She accuses the Court
of too quickly accepting a modern, secular politics of gender
subordination as a religious faith adhering to any significant
Christian tradition.
Yet, almost immediately, Sullivan recognizes the peril of her
argument. Far be it from her, she disclaims as a mere legal
commentator, to declare the “official” theology of the
Mennonites, or to demand that theologies of sin and human
reproduction remain frozen in their pre-1970s instantiation. After
all, the hallmark of Anabaptist traditions like the Mennonites’ is
“low church ecclesiology” (p. 118), emphasizing the authority and
even the duty of lay members to live in accordance with their
(evolving) consciousness of sin and purity. In this sense, the
Court’s easy acceptance of Hobby Lobby’s theology could have
afforded more struggle but ended up at the same place, affirming
and respecting a theology of complicity that may indeed be novel
and developed at the grassroots of the church, but should not be
rejected for all that.
How then to decide the case? Between the hierarchical
deference of Kedroff and the low-church preferences of Hobby
Lobby, should the Court lean towards one theology or another?
Is there a way to make space for religious freedom and theological
difference without one sort of deference or another? Sullivan
raises the questions but by way of answer only enigmatically cites
Robert Cover’s famous Nomos and Narrative. Sullivan joins
Cover in urging that we do not too quickly “dismiss those
alternative worlds” constructed by the religious faithful, for “only
by acknowledging the promise and danger of a plural set of nomoi
would a robust engagement with the zero-sum sovereignty

76. As Sally Gordon has shown, the modern Court has increasingly relied on the
assertion of “sincerely held” beliefs to rid itself of the problem of officially defining
“religion,” a move that would surely raise Establishment problems. See GORDON, supra
note 9, at 210–11. See also Ann Pellegrini, Sincerely Held; Or, the Pastorate 2.0, 34 SOC.
TEXT 71 (2016).
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claimed by the modern state be possible” (p. 125).77
IV. CROSSING AND DWELLING: THE RELIGIOUS
PEOPLE PROPERTY MAKES
Sullivan’s fourth and final chapter is certainly the most
different, yet possibly the most promising. Provocatively titled
“The Body of Christ in Blackface,” the chapter does not take up
a recent Supreme Court case, but rather analyzes the stark
absence of the black church78 from the Court’s implicit political
theology. Instead, Sullivan offers a tentative legal and religious
history of the Angola prison to show how symbolic
“consolidations of black religion have been and continue to be put
to use in law enforcement and corrections today in the US” (p.
128). Tentative, because Sullivan notes up front that “[w]riting
about African-American religious life is today, for a white author,
difficult terrain,” and her engagement with the literature can only
convey “a piece of that story” (pp. 126–127 n.2).
Much of the chapter is, in this reader’s view, somewhat
distracted by Sullivan’s long-running debate with Michael Hallett,
the scholarly champion of the religious accommodations and
faith-based initiatives carried out at Angola.79 Sullivan has been
criticized in the past for maintaining as a scholarly position that
American religious freedom law is impossibly incoherent, while
serving as an advocate to deploy a rigid Establishment Clause

77. While Cover too could be the most Delphic of law and religion writers, he was
too good of a proceduralist to let a case commentary pass without offering his sense of the
best remedy. I take from Nomos and Narrative, for instance, that Cover believed the Court
came near the right answer; he just lamented that neither party in the case nor the Court
itself seemed to really believe its own theology. See Cover, supra note 67, at 67 (“Bob Jones
University seemed uncommitted and lackadaisical in its racist interpretation—unwilling to
put much on the line. The IRS ruling was left shamefully undefended by an administration
unwilling to put anything on the line for the redemptive principle. The Justices responded
in kind: they were unwilling to venture commitment of themselves, to make a firm promise
and to project their understanding of the law onto the future.”).
78. Sullivan duly notes the powerful argument of Barbara Dianne Savage that “there
is no such thing as the black church.” BARBARA DIANNE SAVAGE, YOUR SPIRITS WALK
BESIDE US: THE POLITICS OF BLACK RELIGION 9 (2008), but she responds that there are
“black collective christian imaginaries” that either do or do not wield power, and her task
is to assess the presence, and especially the absence, of the black church-in-law (p. 127).
79. See, e.g., MICHAEL HALLETT ET AL., THE ANGOLA PRISON SEMINARY: EFFECTS
OF FAITH-BASED MINISTRY ON IDENTITY TRANSFORMATION, DESISTANCE, AND
REHABILITATION (2016); Michael Hallett, Faith at Angola Prison, COMMONWEAL, Apr.
14, 2017, at 10.
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doctrine against religious initiatives in prisons,80 and one might
forgive Hallett for finding more certain prescriptions in Sullivan’s
writings than she intended.
Nevertheless, her critique of Hallett is powerful. Taking up
the latter’s astonishing commendation that Angola recapitulates
the vitality of “slave religion” by making space for blackcontrolled religious expression, Sullivan succinctly answers that in
carceral political theology, “[b]ad black religion is seen as
singularly political and therefore usually policed as criminally
dangerous, not as religion” (p. 146). As ever, state-sanctioned
theologies urge law “to make room for the right kind of religion,”
one that neatly fits the Madisonian preference (p. 136). Black
prisoners are welcome to adopt the private beliefs especially of a
liberal Protestantism, so long as their conduct does not disrupt the
almost literal re-enslavement of their bodies.
Surprisingly, then, it is the chapter that is least concerned
with the corporation as such that may have the most to say in
counter to Rakove’s Madisonian individualism. In recent work,
both Sally Gordon and Martha Jones have celebrated the
possibilities that incorporation brought to the early American
black church.81 In an era when even freedmen were denied the
rights of full citizenship, black men and even women (doubly
disfavored by the law) could through their church corporations
hold property, transact business, and crucially, vote on policies of
local import. Sullivan brings a different focus. The same corporate
form that unlocks these possibilities also “stabiliz[es] the church
for purposes of capture” (p. 158). Far more than the revolutionary
Virginians could appreciate, access to the corporate form and the
property it protects works to domesticate religious expression and
defang its own revolutionary impulses.
That is certainly not to say that Sullivan finds the Madisonian
goal worth valorizing, and, indeed, her final chapter offers the
clearest repudiation of the Madisonian theology commended in
Beyond Belief. Sullivan would have us understand that the

80. See Sarah Barringer Gordon, Where the Action Is—Law, Religion, and the
Scholarly Divide, 18 RELIGION & AM. CULTURE 249, 257–60 (2008).
81. Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Wall of Separation between Church and State:
Slavery and Disestablishment in Late Eighteenth-Century Virginia, 85 J.S. HIST. 61 (2019);
Sarah Barringer Gordon, The African Supplement: Religion, Race, and Corporate Law in
Early National America, 72 WM. & MARY Q. 385 (2015); MARTHA S. JONES, BIRTHRIGHT
CITIZENS: A HISTORY OF RACE AND RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 71–88 (2018).
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favored theology of the American state is not just the liberal
Protestantism of James Madison, but the white liberal
Protestantism of the Virginian slaveholder. After all, the
Madisonian denial of religious property rights beyond the
individual conscience finds its total and complete expression not
in the juridical conquest of the Mormons, but in the everyday law
of slavery: believe however you like, only conform your conduct
to your master’s law. Rakove remarks that “[t]he religious
violence that Mormons suffered . . . has no parallel in American
history” (p. 130), apparently forgetting the lesson that Alfred
Raboteau long ago taught us, that American slavery represents
the greatest Christian persecution in the history of the western
hemisphere.82 Theologies of property that accommodated slavery
gradually became the official theology of at least half of America’s
churches, and in turn the official theologies of the antebellum
state.83 “Whether racism is or is not latent in Christianity as some
have argued, it was arguably control of the churches by
slaveowners that led to creation of the black church-in-law in
North America and the Caribbean,” Sullivan concludes (p. 143).
The racial cast to the official political theologies of the
United States helps to make sense of some of the Court’s most
recent cases on free expression: the review of state lockdown
orders in response to the Covid-19 pandemic and the approval of
the Trump administration’s notorious “Muslim Ban” after several
rounds of revision. In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court upheld travel
restrictions imposed on predominantly Muslim nations
notwithstanding the apparent racial and religious animus of the
administration’s calls for, to take one example, a “total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until
our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.”84
In the Covid-19 cases, the Supreme Court narrowly sustained
state restrictions on religious gatherings with the warning that
states must regulate religious gatherings no more severely than
“comparable” secular activities. In Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, a five-member majority of the Court, writing
in a per curiam opinion, found that New York had crossed the line

82. ALBERT J. RABOTEAU, SLAVE RELIGION: THE “INVISIBLE INSTITUTION” IN
THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 333–34 (updated ed. 2004).
83. See CHRISTINE LEIGH HEYRMAN, SOUTHERN CROSS: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE
BIBLE BELT (1998); MARK A. NOLL, THE CIVIL WAR AS A THEOLOGICAL CRISIS (2006).
84. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018).
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by limiting religious gatherings to 10 or 25 congregants in certain
high risk zones while permitting “essential businesses” to admit
any number of patrons.85
One prominent scholar has recently linked the two groups of
cases, declaring the Court’s Roman Catholic Diocese to be a
twenty-first century “Anti-Korematsu,” referring to the “anticanon” case that sustained Japanese internment and was declared
overruled (rather indirectly) in Trump v. Hawaii.86 The argument
makes a certain legal sense: In Korematsu, the Court overlooked
significant evidence of racial animus and deferred to the
Executive in a case of apparent emergency; in Roman Catholic
Diocese, the Court enjoined a state executive in the midst of an
emergency to protect individual rights.87 But that reading makes
little theological sense.
Consider the religious sensitivities of Roman Catholic
Diocese. The per curiam and concurring opinions engage in
remarkable theological sympathy with the petitioners, a group of
churches under a single Catholic diocese and an association of
Orthodox Jewish synagogues. Propertied rites are so ever present
in the opinions they are rarely analyzed as such. The majority
assumes that gathering together on a specific parcel of land,
engaging the material world of air, space, and time in all the ways
that might raise medical risks are nevertheless the essence of
religious exercise.88 While livestreams of religious services can be
viewed at home, the Court finds that “remote viewing is not the
same as personal attendance.” Christians “cannot receive
communion.” More vaguely, “there are important religious
85. 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam). See also Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v.
Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020) (mem.) (sustaining a directive limiting in-person worship
services to 50 people); S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020)
(mem.) (sustaining an executive order limiting in-person worship to the lower of 25%
capacity or 100 attendees).
86. Cass R. Sunstein, Our Anti-Korematsu (December 29, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3756853. On “anti-canonical” cases, see Jamal
Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011).
87. Sunstein, supra note 86.
88. The dissents engage in theological imagination too. Justice Breyer, relying on the
district court’s findings, takes it for granted that propertied rites in churches are akin to
“similar gatherings” at “public lectures, concerts, or theatrical performances,” rather than
the ebb and flow of bodies through a marketplace. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. at 76 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Sotomayor makes the same comparison and assumes throughout that
singing must take place at church services, essentializing a religious rite the petitioners
themselves claimed they had foregone during the pandemic. Id. at 79 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
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traditions in the Orthodox Jewish faith that require personal
attendance.”89 Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence infers the
theological judgment of the New York government in declaring
businesses “essential” but churches inessential. In justifying the
extraordinary process of a temporary injunction originating out of
the high court, Justice Gorsuch vividly imagines the anxieties of
rabbis approaching “the High Holy Days . . . , or priests preparing
for Christmas.”90
One wonders where this religious imagination was in Trump
v. Hawaii. Despite the presence of a Muslim mosque among the
petitioners, nowhere does the majority concern itself with
theologies of sacred gatherings, religious crossings and
dwellings,91 or anxieties that the Court’s order might disrupt
Ramadan observances. One might respond as the Court majority
largely did: Neither the mosque nor its many amici actually
asserted a religious freedom claim. Instead, they argued under the
Establishment Clause and thus took on the burden of showing
that a facially neutral law was instituting a religious preference.92
But that seems to be the precise point to which Sullivan’s work
would call our attention. Religious freedom claims are for
localized, propertied, truly liberal believers. The Court does not
have, because it has not developed, the capacity to think
theologies of God’s chosen people on national or supranational
scales, to believe a religious exercise claim can be made by
massive groups who do not all engage in the propertied rituals the
Court is used to seeing done. To make those claims is to speak
another language, and to fall subject to another Clause, another
law, another theology.

89. Id. at 68.
90. Id. at 72 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
91. See THOMAS A. TWEED, CROSSING AND DWELLING: A THEORY OF RELIGION
(2008). Tweed seeks “a theory of religion that ma[kes] sense of the religious life of
transnational migrants and addresse[s] three themes—movement, relation, and position,”
making the work particularly valuable for thinking about propertied rites. Id. at 5.
92. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17965); Brief for Interfaith Group of Religious and Irreligious Organizations as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965); Brief for National
Association of Muslim Lawyers and Other Muslim Bar Associations as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965); Brief for Muslim Justice
League et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17965); Brief of Episcopal Bishops as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Trump, 138 S.
Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965); Brief for Freedom from Religion Foundation as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965).
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V. CONCLUSION

How shall we then live?93 Rakove propounds a political
theology that has wrought disastrous and violent consequences
throughout American history and can hardly be tallied as a victory
for religious freedom. Sullivan’s careful and nuanced
ethnography of the Supreme Court’s political theology refrains
from answering ultimate questions of remedy.
Or maybe it would be more precise to say that the opinions
of the Supreme Court are penultimate questions of remedy that
Sullivan disregards. Elsewhere Sullivan has written that the
Court’s decisions handed down since the publication of her book
have been unsurprising but also uninteresting. Whichever way the
Court rules, she seems to regard the real tragedy that the cases
have arisen in the first place. “The new ACA contraception cases
reflect the failure to create universal health care. The school
voucher cases reflect the deliberate failure to invest in quality
public schooling,” she concludes.94 The current flash points of
religious freedom, that is, address merely the mild systems and not
the root causes of the liberal regime of property and religion in
the U.S. In a nation with a superabundance of property but a
hollow conception of the common-wealth, a certain rivalry cannot
be avoided between a church and state that must scramble over
the artificially induced scarcity of goods fit for human flourishing.
In her conclusion, Sullivan takes up the Masterpiece
Cakeshop decision.95 Like her discussion of Hobby Lobby,
Sullivan avoids telling us how the case should come out, but does
offer more specific guidance on how a court should approach such
a case. As with Hobby Lobby, Masterpiece Cakeshop is “not doing
something new in mixing business and God,” but Sullivan laments
the Court’s sustained reluctance to engage with the actual
theology at issue in the case (p. 174). The Court’s repeated
acceptance of theological assertions under the assumption they
are sincerely held beliefs means “[i]t has become impossible for
93. The question is drawn from Ezekiel 33:10 and 2 Peter 3:11, two key texts of
political theology in the Christian scriptures, but the question as worded was most
popularly posed by Francis Schaeffer’s 1970s documentary on the decline of Christian
civilization, a documentary that, for better and for worse, may have done more than any
other work to mobilize modern evangelical politics in the U.S. See, e.g., R. Albert Mohler
Jr., How Will We Live Now? Francis Schaeffer’s ‘How Should We Then Live?’After 40
Years, 84 S. SEMINARY 25 (2016).
94. Moyn & Sullivan, supra note 63.
95. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd., v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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the Court to talk about religious stuff with any seriousness” (p.
170). Instead, Sullivan invites the courts to take up the theological
conversation specifically. Ask the owner of the cakeshop about
the precise contours of his theology, challenge him with the
possible inconsistencies and tensions that might arise, “[a]nd then
listen to his response” (p. 175).96 If “[t]he liberal state does coerce
people to live by the will of its God”—and Sullivan is sure that it
does—at least it can exhibit a “humility about the reach and
commitment of [its] own imaginations and possibilities” and
exchange the rancid individualism of the liberal order for the
political community that might grow out of the serious exchange
of juridical theology (pp. 162–63, 176–77).
As someone who has studied the rancorous theological
debates that erupted in civil courts adjudicating church property
disputes, I admit that even I see the appeal of courts speaking
theology more explicitly (rather than, as so many now do,
speaking theology covertly). True, theology is beyond the
professional competencies of most U.S. judges, but of course
many, if not most, property adjudications require generalist
judges to specialize in unfamiliar domains if only for the duration
of a case. The common law tradition is nothing if not a set of
techniques for managing respect for and adaptation of local
folkways and foreign laws binding on a particular property.97 The
common law has its use for fictions, too, to manage the tensions
that may arise, but at this point the fiction that the secular liberal
state can coherently secure a right of religious freedom to all is
likely doing more harm than good.98
But if courts were to more clearly talk theology, we should
be clear about the limits of Sullivan’s approach. Most likely, space
for religious dissidence would not expand all that much. For what
Madison and Jefferson did quite properly understand was that
96. Sullivan’s suggestion accords with recent commentary by Jamal Greene, also on
Masterpiece Cakeshop: “Courts should be reminding us what we have in common. They
should be granting just enough leverage on each side that we have no choice but to sit
across from each other at the table, to look each other in the eye, and to speak to and hear
each other.” JAMAL GREENE, HOW RIGHTS WENT WRONG: WHY OUR OBSESSION WITH
RIGHTS IS TEARING AMERICA APART 163 (2021). Compare with Sullivan’s powerful
image of gathering the Masterpiece Cakeshop litigants around a table at 178.
97. See, e.g., KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, 1790–1900: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM (2013).
98. Lon Fuller essentially defined legal fictions as lies nobody believes. The danger
of legal fictions arises, he surmised, when people start to actually believe the fiction. LON
L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9–10 (1967).

FUNK 36:1

210

7/6/2021 11:13 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 36:175

religion is dangerous to the state. Calvinists behead kings;
jihadists crash planes into symbols of public wealth and power;
white Christian insurrectionists storm the Capitol and offer
prayers of consecration over the Senate podium.99 Though
scholars debate the precise extent of influence, nearly all agree
that religious fervor was critical fuel to the American Revolution,
the abolition of slavery, and the Civil Rights Revolution, all of
which fundamentally transformed state structures and the
ownership and deployment of property.100 We should not expect
that a court speaking theology will speak it against the safety of
the state very often.
That is all to say that Sullivan’s proposal for a juridical ethic
of humility is itself a commitment of political theology, one that
will occasion cases that set limits on the boundaries and police
them, even violently.101 But humility may be a good place to start,
for all that. It recalls the powerful image of Augustine’s City of
God—the Christian church as civitas peregrina, denizens on
pilgrimage, or, as it may best be translated today, resident
aliens.102 Political theologians most often use the civitas peregrina
concept to instruct the Christian faithful towards humility, if not
quietism, within the public order in which they find themselves.
But recent readings of Augustine have found in the image a
rebuke of state power itself.103 As all civilized states recognize that
99. On the religious origins and inflections of the events of January 6, 2021, see
Emma Green, A Christian Insurrection, ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2021, 1:36 PM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/01/evangelicals-catholics-jerichomarch-capitol/617591/. For video of the prayer, see A Reporter’s Footage from Inside the
Capitol Siege, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 17, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/videodept/a-reporters-footage-from-inside-the-capitol-siege.
100. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KIDD, GOD OF LIBERTY: A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2012); HENRY MAYER, ALL ON FIRE: WILLIAM LLOYD
GARRISON AND THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY (2008); DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF
HOPE: PROPHETIC RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF JIM CROW (2009).
101. Here we might turn to Robert Cover’s other pathbreaking work in political
theology. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
102. See M.A. Claussen, “Peregrinatio” and “Peregrini” in Augustine’s “City of God,”
46 TRADITIO 33, 39, 50 (1991).
103. Political Augustinianism has seen a revival over the last decade. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL J.S. BRUNO, POLITICAL AUGUSTINIANISM: MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF
AUGUSTINE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2014); ERIC GREGORY, POLITICS AND THE ORDER
OF LOVE: AN AUGUSTINIAN ETHIC OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP (2010); CHARLES
MATHEWES, THE REPUBLIC OF GRACE: AUGUSTINIAN THOUGHTS FOR DARK TIMES
(2010). On the application of Augustine’s City of God to theologies of state humility, see
especially OLIVER O’DONOVAN, THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS: REDISCOVERING THE
ROOTS OF POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1996); OLIVER O’DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF
JUDGMENT (2008). For an application of O’Donovan’s thought to American evangelical
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within their midst they will have travelers of divided loyalties
whose lives and chattels must nevertheless be protected and
activities tolerated to a certain extent, so the state in the
saeculum104 must humbly recognize the religious others within its
midst and accommodate their propertied rites within its own
limited jurisdiction.
A humble state facing and accommodating a humble church,
which faces and accommodates its potential rivals in turn, is, to be
sure, not something one has seen done very often. Still, “blessed
are they who did not see, but being blind, believed.”105

politics, see JAMES K. A. SMITH, AWAITING THE KING: REFORMING PUBLIC THEOLOGY
(2017).
104. On the secularism not as an absence of religion but as a period of theological
time, see R. A. MARKUS, SAECULUM: HISTORY AND SOCIETY IN THE THEOLOGY OF ST.
AUGUSTINE (1988).
105. G. K. CHESTERTON, THE MAN WHO WAS THURSDAY: A NIGHTMARE, at v
(1908).

FUNK 36:1

7/6/2021 11:13 PM

